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Abstract
We analyse Selten’s concept of trembling hand perfect equilibria
in the context of quantum game theory. We define trembles as mixed
quantum strategies by replacing discrete probabilities with probability
distribution functions. Explicit examples of analysis are given.
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1 Introduction
Multiple applications of game theory and the development of quantum infor-
mation theory created the combination of both – the quantum game theory,
which extends the classical game theory to the quantum domain. Many po-
tential applications of quantum information processing – Shor’s algorithm,
commercially available quantum cryptography and current work on quan-
tum econophysics [1] – open possibilities of future application of quantum
game theory to market [1, 2, 3], gambling [4], social sciences [5] (the cooper-
ation of players as the entanglement of their states), decision science [6] and
the information theory itself, by putting information processing problems
into the realm of quantum decision theory [7].
Implementation of a quantum game or a quantum algorithm involves
problems due to technical limitations as well as the quantum theory itself
and we can hardly hope for perfectness in quantum state preparation and
implementation of quantum gates (strategies) – every real apparatus gener-
ates noise [8, 9]. In the case of a game there arises a question of stability of
equilibria – do the ’solutions’ of a game survive when uncertainties in the ap-
plication of strategies (or quantum gates) appear? Several forms of stability
of equilibria are known in the game theory, depending on the definition of
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perturbation which the game is undergoing, for example Selten’s trembling
hand perfectness [10], Myerson’s properness [11] or Mertens stability [12].
In this paper we analyse trembling hand perfectness of quantum equilibria
with respect to trembles coming from uncertainty of strategies performed by
players. This problem is one of the keystones of implementation of quantum
games.
2 Trembling hand perfectness – classical case
The notion of the trembling hand perfect equilibrium was put forward by
Selten as a refinement of Nash equilibrium (NE). An equilibrium is trem-
bling hand perfect (THP) if there exists a sequence of perturbed equilibria
converging to it. Perturbations are given by small probabilities of playing
non-equilibrium strategies – a player plays a completely mixed strategy in-
stead of playing a pure equilibrium one (we may say hands of the players
are trembling therefore they make mistakes in the choice of their strategies
during the game). To be precise, a strategy profile σ is a trembling hand per-
fect equilibrium if there exists a sequence of totally mixed strategy profiles
σn → σ such that ∧
i
∧
si∈Si
$i(σi, σ
n
−1) ≥ $i(si, σn−1), (1)
where $i is the payoff function for the ith player, depending on strategies σi
and σ−i (which represents strategies from the strategy profile σ for players
other than i) and si is a pure strategy from the strategy space Si [13].
As an example of trembling hand perfect and imperfect equilibria we use
the game (later on referred to by EG) with the payoff bimatrix:
B
A
C D
C (1,1) (2,0)
D (0,2) (2,2)
The players – Alice (A) and Bob (B) – both can use strategy C or D.
In the payoff bimatrix above left numbers represent payoffs for Alice, right
ones – for Bob. The game is symmetric and has two Nash equilibria – (C,C)
and (D,D). Let us calculate expected payoffs for players, when the other
one plays his strategy perturbed by ’trembles’.
When we analyse the first equilibrium, Alice plays a mixed strategy
σA = (pC , pD) = (1− ǫ, ǫ) (strategy C perturbed by trembles – she plays D
with small probability ǫ) and Bob’s expected payoffs from playing C and D
are given by:
C : $B(σA, C) = 1(1 − ǫ) + 2ǫ = 1 + ǫ, (2)
D : $B(σA, B) = 0(1 − ǫ) + 2ǫ = 2ǫ. (3)
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As we can see, for small values of ǫ it is best for Bob to play C. Because
the game is symmetric, Alice encounters the same situation when Bob’s
hand playing strategy C is trembling – and (C,C) is a trembling hand
perfect equilibrium (THP). If we perform similar calculations for (D,D) we
find that when a player plays D ’contaminated’ with C, it is best for his
opponent to play C – the equilibrium (D,D) is not trembling hand perfect
(THiP).
3 Quantum games – mixed and generalised con-
tinuously mixed strategies – trembles
We use mixed states to introduce mixed strategies. Usually the problem is
formulated in the following way [14]: the Alice’s and Bob’s strategies
Ai = A(θ
A
i , α
A
i , β
A
i ) = A(Ω
A
i ) (4)
Bj = B(θ
B
j , α
B
j , β
B
j ) = B(Ω
B
j ), (5)
together with the payoff operator (see Appendix A) give us the expected
payoff functions:
〈$A(sAi , sBj )〉 = Tr(PAρf (Ai, Bj)) (6)
〈$¯A〉 =
∑
i,j
pAi p
B
j 〈$A(sAi , sBj )〉 (7)
where Ω
A(B)
i is the set of parameters of the unitary strategy Alice (Bob)
uses and the bar means the strategies are mixed. As we need completely
mixed strategies to analyse trembling hand perfectness of equilibria, we use
probability distribution functions (PDFs) fA(B)(Ω) instead of discrete prob-
abilities. We integrate the payoff functions over all strategy spaces with
measure µ:
〈$¯A〉 =
∫
SU(2)×SU(2)
fA(Ω
A,ΩA0 )fB(Ω
B,ΩB0 )×
× 〈$A(A(ΩA), B(ΩB))〉µ(ΩA)µ(ΩB) (8)
The whole strategy space is the space of quantum operations – trace pre-
serving positive maps. However we restrict ourselves to (special, as overall
phases do not change values of payoff functions) unitary operations. Fur-
thermore, due to symmetries of the payoff functions, we use U ∈ SU(2)
matrices of the form given below, with θ ∈ [−π, π], α ∈ [0, 2π], β ∈ [0, 2π].
As our resulting strategy space is the torus S1 × S1 × S1, we use von Mises
distributions (S1 version of vMF PDF – see Appendix B) in each parameter
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space.
U(θ, α, β) =
[
eiα/2 cos θ/2 eiβ/2 sin θ/2
−e−iβ/2 sin θ/2 e−iα/2 cos θ/2
]
(9)
c2 =
1
2πI0(κ)
(10)
f(Ω,Ω0) = c
3
2 exp[κ(cos(θ − θ0) + cos(α− α0) + cos(β − β0))], (11)
where c2 is the S
1 normalisation factor. The integral (8) gives us the ex-
pected payoff in the case of two initially pure strategies smeared over the
whole SU(2). This method of perturbing can be easily extended to the
case of classical discretely mixed strategies (the integral parameters are sup-
pressed due to their obviousness):
〈$¯A〉 =
∑
i,j
pAi p
B
j
∫
SU(2)×SU(2)
fAi f
B
j 〈$A(A,B)〉µAµB . (12)
For n × n games, we need higher dimensional strategy spaces, namely
SU(n), so instead of using qubits, we need to speak in the language of qunits.
For N players the expected payoff function appears of the form:
〈$¯A〉 =
∫
· · ·
∫
SU(n)×...×SU(n)
fA(Ω
A,ΩA0 )fB(Ω
B ,ΩB0 ) . . . fN (Ω
N ,ΩN0 )×
× 〈$A(A(ΩA), B(ΩB), . . . , N(ΩN ))〉µ(ΩA)µ(ΩB) . . . µ(ΩN ), (13)
where, in the case of mixed strategies needed to analyse trembling hand
perfectness of equilibria, probability distribution functions would be SU(N)
analogues of Gauss or rather von Mises-Fisher distributions.
4 Analysis
We perturb pure strategies by smearing them over the whole strategy space
using certain probability distribution functions, which go smoothly to the
pure case (Dirac’s delta distribution) in the limit. Changes of the parameter
describing our perturbations do not change the qualitative properties of the
shape of the payoff functions (except for the Stag Hunt game, where the
change is shown in detail), thus only one example of perturbed function in
each case is presented below, where the properties of the shape are clearly
visible.
4.1 The Prisoners’ Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a commonly used game with the payoff
bimatrix given by:
4
BA
C D
C (3,3) (0,5)
D (5,0) (1,1)
When we analyse this classical game we acquire the following mixed strategy
payoffs (one parameter strategy space) – fig. 1.
In the case of two parameters we restrict the strategy space by taking
β = 0 in formula (9) SU(2) matrix thus getting the torus S1 × S1. Then
we use vM PDF for S1 parameter spaces to introduce trembles. We observe
stability of Nash equilibrium given by the strategy profile (Q,Q), where Q
is a strategy of the form:
Q = U(0, π, 0) =
[
i 0
0 −i
]
. (14)
For the case of pure Bob’s strategy B = Q and Alice’s strategy A unper-
turbed, the equilibrium point is clearly seen as a maximum of Alice’s payoff
function (fig. 2 – left). For all cases of κ we investigate, the payoff functions
are preserving their shape with maximum representing the Nash equilib-
rium (fig. 2 – right). This behaviour is present when both Alice’s and Bob’s
strategies are disturbed by trembles as well.
Next we leave pure Bob’s strategy within the two parameter strategy
space while Alice’s trembling hand smears her strategy over the full three
parameters strategy space. In spite of trembling Alice’s strategy, payoff
functions preserve their qualitative properties (fig. 3).
4.2 An example of a 2× 2 game – quantum case
As we previously mentioned EG possesses two classical equilibria, one of
which is THiP. Mixed strategy payoffs for this game are given by figures (4).
Figures (5) present $B as a function of Bob’s strategy and the concentration
parameter. The persistent maximum for (C,C) (θ = 0) is clearly seen, as
well as the imperfectness of (D,D) (θ = π) – it is preferred for Bob to
change his strategy D for C for all values of κ under investigation.
After extending our strategy space to two parameters one classical equi-
librium remains – (D,D) – as a weak maximum of payoff function (fig. 6).
The strategy profile (C,C) ceases to be an equilibrium in the quantum case
(fig. 7). However, when the opponent’s strategy is trembling in a two pa-
rameter space the strategy D is not an equilibrium anymore, for it is better
to play C (fig. 8).
Surprisingly, when we allow Alice’s hand to tremble in the three parame-
ter space the strategy profile (D,D) persists to be an equilibrium – trembles
just flatten the payoff function without changing its qualitative properties
(fig. 9).
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4.3 The Stag Hunt
Another game taken into consideration is the Stag Hunt (SH). The game is
described by the following payoff bimatrix:
B
A
C D
C (10,10) (0,8)
D (8,0) (7,7)
In the classical case (fig. 10) the game has two NE – (C,C) and (D,D) –
one of which is Pareto optimal (C,C) and both are trembling hand perfect.
However, in the quantum case we get quite a different behaviour – one
of the equilibria disappears (D,D), but a new one emerges - (Q,Q). Both
quantum equilibria are Pareto optimal and trembling hand perfect, but in
SH there is only certain range of κ for which the perfectness remains. When
κ is lower than threshold depending on the dimension of trembles, the sta-
bility of (C,C) vanishes (figs. 12, 13 – this effect is seen for two and three
parameter trembles, the best strategy response for C becomes Q). In other
words, when the errors in an implementation of this game exceed certain
limit this quantum equilibrium dissapear, unlike in the case of PD and EG,
where perfectness and imperfectness are present regardless of the κ value.
The perfectness of the equilibrium (Q,Q) in SH does not depend on the
value of κ.
5 Conclusions
We have extended the idea of a tremble to the quantum game theory do-
main and analysed three quantum versions of classical games in the context
of trembling hand perfectness of their equilibria. In the case of the Prison-
ers’ Dilemma the quantum NE found by Eisert et al. appears to be stable
with respect to trembles in both two and three parameter case. The Exam-
ple Game has a weak equilibrium which is trembling hand imperfect when
the game is perturbed in the two parameter space (and in the classical –
one parameter – case). However, when the trembles in the third parameter
are allowed, the weak equilibrium survives. In the Stag Hunt game one of
two equilibria looses its stability when the errors exceed certain threshold
and only one equilibrium remains. Due to uncertainties during the imple-
mentation of a game, three parameter trembles seem to be more accurate
to predict the behaviour of equilibria, even if the strategy space is limited
to two parameters. In all cases we have investigated, we find that three
parameter trembles are not destroying the equilibria unless the implemen-
tation errors are small enough. However, perfectness of NE in the general
case as well as other criteria of stability need to be investigated.
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6 Appendix A – Quantum games
In our calculations we use Eisert et al. scheme [14, 15] of performing quan-
tum games, with mixed states formalism. We work in the 2 × 2 scheme,
so we have two basic strategies, identity (let us describe this strategy by
C, following the Prisoners’ Dilemma game) and bit-flip (D), spanning two
dimensional space. We generalise a classical bit to a qubit getting SU(2) as
a player’s strategy set. Thus 2 × 2 games are described by two qubits and
unitary operations on them (in general - completely positive trace preserv-
ing maps). Players’ unitary operations (quantum gates) are parametrised
by three parameters in general:
U(θ, α, β) =
[
eiα cos θ/2 eiβ sin θ/2
−e−iβ sin θ/2 e−iα cos θ/2
]
(15)
Classical basic strategies are then:
C = U(0, 0, 0) =
[
1 0
0 1
]
(16)
D = U(π, 0, 0) =
[
0 1
−1 0
]
(17)
Initial and final states are given by
ρi = πCC = |ψCC〉〈ψCC | (18)
ρf = (A⊗B)ρi(A⊗B)+. (19)
Projectors π are defined by the Bell states:
πCC = |ψCC〉〈ψCC |, |ψCC〉 = (|00〉 + i|11〉)/
√
2 (20)
πCD = |ψCD〉〈ψCD|, |ψCD〉 = (|01〉 − i|10〉)/
√
2 (21)
πDC = |ψDC〉〈ψDC |, |ψDC〉 = (|10〉 − i|01〉)/
√
2 (22)
πDD = |ψDD〉〈ψDD|, |ψDD〉 = (|11〉 + i|00〉)/
√
2. (23)
Payoff operators are then:
PA = aCCπCC + aCDπCD + aDCπDC + aDDπDD (24)
PB = bCCπCC + bCDπCD + bDCπDC + bDDπDD. (25)
7
with payoff matrices
[
aCC aCD
aDC aDD
]
,
[
bCC bCD
bDC bDD
]
(26)
for Alice and Bob respectively and expected payoffs given by:
〈$A〉 = Tr(PAρf ) (27)
〈$B〉 = Tr(PBρf ). (28)
In the case of classical mixed strategies player A can use strategy sAi with
probability pAi and the same for player B (with adequate indices changed).
The average (expected) payoff for player A is given by:
$¯A =
∑
i,j
pAi p
B
j $A(s
A
i , s
B
j ) (29)
In Eisert’s realisation of quantum games, classical mixed strategies are
represented by operators U(θ, α, β) = U(θ, 0, 0) so pA,BC = cos
2 θA,B and
pA,BD = sin
2 θA,B.
7 Appendix B – von Mises-Fisher PDF
Because our strategy spaces are spheres or tori, our PDFs representing trem-
bles are the von Mises-Fisher distributions [16] (vMF PDFs), which are
spherical versions of normal (Gauss) distribution. For a sphere Sp−1 with
measure µp(Ω) this distribution is of the form:
f = cp(κ) exp(κxˆ(Ω) · xˆ0(Ω0))µp(Ω) (30)
cp =
κp/2−1
(2π)p/2Ip/2−1(κ)
(31)
where cp is the normalisation factor, κ is the concentration parameter and
Iν(x) is the modified Bessel function of order ν. Versors xˆ and xˆ0 give a
direction on a sphere, xˆ0 is the direction to the centre of the distribution (the
average value). In the case of κ → ∞ vMF PDF goes to the Dirac delta
distribution giving us the pure strategy. For κ → 0 we acquire uniform
probability distribution. Plots of von Mises distributions applied to two
compact dimensions for different values of concentration parameter are given
on figure 14.
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Figure 1: PD: Payoff for Alice and Bob playing pure strategies against pure
opponent strategies, classical case (1 parameter – mixed strategies)
Figure 2: PD, 2 parameters. Left: Payoff for Alice playing pure strategy
against Bob playing pure Q. Right: Payoff for Bob’s pure strategy against
Alice’s trembling Q, κ = 5
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Figure 3: PD, 3 parameters: Payoff for Alice (left) and Bob (right) when
Alice plays trembling strategies against pure Bob’s Q, κ = 1
Figure 4: EG: Payoff for Alice and bob playing pure strategies against pure
opponent strategies, classical case (1 parameter – mixed strategies)
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Figure 5: EG. Left: Perfection of classical equilibrium: Alice plays trembling
C, Bob plays pure strategy. Right: Imperfection of classical equilibrium:
Alice plays trembling D, Bob plays pure strategy.
Figure 6: EG, 2 parameters: Payoff for Alice playing pure strategies against
pure Bob’s D; payoff for Bob playing pure strategies against pure Alice’s D
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Figure 7: EG, 2 parameters: Payoff for Alice playing pure strategies against
pure Bob’s C; payoff for Bob playing pure strategies against pure Alice’s C
Figure 8: EG, 2 parameters: Payoff for Bob playing pure strategies against
trembling Alice’s D, κ = 1
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Figure 9: EG, 3 parameters: Payoff for Bob playing pure strategies against
trembling Alice’s D, κ = 1
Figure 10: SH: Payoff for Alice and Bob playing pure strategies against pure
opponent strategies, classical case (1 parameter – mixed strategies)
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Figure 11: SH, 2 parameters. Left: payoff for Alice playing pure strategy
against Bob playing pure C. Right: payoff for Alice playing pure strategy
against Bob playing pure Q (the game is symmetric)
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Figure 12: SH, 2 parameters: Payoff for Bob’s pure strategy against Alice’s
trembling C, κ = 1, 1.5, 1.75, 5 – the equilibrium appears when κ > 1.5
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Figure 13: SH, 3 parameters: Payoff for Bob playing pure strategies against
trembling Alice’s C, κ = 0.5, 1, 5 – the equilibrium appears when κ > 1
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Figure 14: 2D von Mises-Fisher distribution, κ = 0.2, 1, 5, 25
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